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The  topic of meaningful work (MW) continues to attract attention in managerial and 
business ethics research. Defined as  the degree of significance employees believe their work 
possesses, MW is an established theoretical/normative and empirical/descriptive area of 
scholarship. Several studies indicate that  MW has positive effects to both employee and 
organizational outcomes. It relates to employees’ wellbeing, mental health, motivation and 
performance,   and job satisfaction (Fouche et al. 2017; Steger et al. 2012; Parker and Bevan 2011). 
On the part of the  organization, MW promotes organizational citizenship and commitment, work 
engagement, increased productivity, employee retention, and reduction of employee cynicism 
(Michaelson et al. 2014; Lips-Wiersma and Morris 2009; Cartwright 2006 ).  Decline in job 
satisfaction has adverse effects to the company in terms of frequent tardiness and absences of 
workers, high employee turnover, and strained communication between management and 
employee.  On the other hand, job alienation, the inverse of MW has substantial negative effects 
on employee engagement, organizational commitment, work effort, and work-to-family 
enrichment (Tummers and Den Dulk 2013; Overell 2009; Kanungo 1992). From a philosophical 
standpoint, the search for meaning is an essential part of  being human.  Thus, the concept  of MW 
“finds its roots in the humanities rather than in management theory.” (Lips-Wiersma and Morris 
2009, p. 657)  
 However, researchers in various fields who have  systematically studied this topic still 
encounter a number of difficulties. To begin with, there is little consensus on what exactly makes 
work meaningful. According to Ciulla (2000), MW also entails a sense that one’s life is meaningful 
and worth living.  To promote MW, it is not enough to provide workers with jobs that are 
challenging or interesting. The deeper  spiritual needs of the workers must also be addressed, for 
“the mark of true meaningfulness is that it is based on personal discovery and free choice rather 
than prescription and domination.”(Lips-Wiersma and Morris 2009,  p. 494) But while it is true  
that MW has  subjective dimension since it is experienced on a personal level, “an exclusive focus 
on individuals remains an inadequate account of the concept of meaningfulness.” (Overel1 2009, 
pp. 42-43) In addition, Lips-Wiersma and Morris (2009, p. 508) point out the need to consider 
differences in cultural and spiritual beliefs in studying MW. Most studies in this area are Western-
centric, with very few that attempt to consider non-Western  and cross-cultural perspectives 
(Michaelson et al. 2014).  The question on whether MW varies across cultures is rarely addressed. 
In this global economy where more people of diverse cultural and religious backgrounds are 
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working in the same company, there is a growing need to understand how different cultures view 
what is work and what makes it meaningful (Michaelson et al. 2014). 
This study adds to the existing literature on MW by offering a cross-cultural perspective. 
Since work shapes our personality and plays an important role in our well-being, some theorists 
have adopted a virtue theory approach to MW using an Aristotelian-MacIntyrean framework. For 
lack of a better term,  I will call this a Western Virtue Theory (WVT). This paper presents a  
contemporary virtue-focused Buddhist perspective on MW. By contemporary Buddhism, I refer 
to  new modes of Buddhism that result from  its encounter with Western  philosophy as it engages  
with the  modern world.    Western philosophy provides sophisticated and clearly defined 
conceptualizations and taxonomies that are not found in classical Buddhism. Such approach does 
“not only refine our interpretations but also generate new insights and new perspectives that 
otherwise would not arise.” (Velez 2013, p. 502) According to  Whitehill (2000, p. 3), “no one 
argues that Buddhist ethics or morality are sui generis, a unique and inviolate form of Buddhist 
tradition to be transplanted whole and entire into Western cultural soil.”   However one must not 
expect a perfect fit between Western and Buddhist concepts as the risk of superimposing Western 
categories is always there. As Edelglass (2014, pp. 477-478) notes, “no one Western meta-ethical 
theory provides an adequate theoretical framework for grasping moral thinking in any of the major 
traditions of Buddhism, and a fortiori, the vast and heterogeneously diverse tradition of Buddhism 
as a whole.”   
Since the publication of Schumacher’s seminal work on Buddhist economics, there has 
been an increased interest in the field of business ethics on Buddhism  and the insights that it offers 
to humanize the workplace. Several articles have been published that demonstrate the relevance of 
Buddhism to  organizational and managerial practice (Chang et al 2012; Low and Purser 2012;  
Case and Brohm  2012; Marques 2012, 2010; Borden and Shekhawat 2010; Gould 1995). 
Buddhism is an important cultural component not only of countries that are predominantly 
Buddhist, but of other societies that have come in contact with it. To develop a Buddhist 
perspective on MW,  I will draw heavily from the works of   Buddhist scholars, particularly in the 
West who use a virtue framework in interpreting Buddhist ethics. According to Keown (1992, p. 
21), “Aristotle’s ethical theory appears to be the closest Western analogue to Buddhist ethics, and 
is an illuminating guide to an understanding of the Buddhist moral system.” 1  He considers 
Buddhist ethics as a type of teleological virtue ethics.2  Aristotle’s argument is predicated on the 
claim that we have a final end (telos) and virtues  enable us to achieve it.   For the Buddha this 
 
1 See also Fink (2013); Lysenko (2007); Gowan (2003); Whitehill (2000); Harvey (2000); Swearer (1998).  
“While the interpretation of Buddhist ethics as a virtue ethics is now widespread, not everyone has been 
convinced by Keown’s interpretation of Buddhist ethics as sharing essential characteristics with 
Aristotelian moral philosophy. Some scholars, such as Georges Dreyfus, suggest that Keown went too far 
in searching for similarities between Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics and that a better correspondence is 
the eudaimonistic virtue ethics as articulated by one or another of the later Hellenistic philosophers, such 
as the Epicureans, Stoics, or Skeptics.” (Edelglass 2015, p. 481) 
2 It  is teleological but not consequentialist because  there is an intrinsic connection between means and 
end. Virtues are not only instrumental good but good in themselves in the sense that they are constitutive 
of  the highest good. “In both Aristotelian and Buddhist ethics, an action is right because it embodies a 
virtue which conduces to and ‘participates’ in the goal of human perfection. Both are ‘teleological’ in that 
they advocate action which moves towards a telos or goal/end with which they have an intrinsic 
relationship” (Harvey 2000, p. 20).  
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goal is nibbana (or nirvana in Sanskrit) –  the escape from the karmic cycle of rebirth or samsara. 
“In Buddhism virtuous choices are rational choices motivated by a desire for what is good and 
deriving their validation ultimately from the final good for man (nirvana)” (Keown 1992, p. 221). 
Nibbana is the summum bonum,  the realization  of both the highest morality and the unconditioned 
reality.3 Both Aristotle and Buddhism postulate   the human potential for perfection through 
practices of self-development. Rather than a set commandments or moral rules,  many Buddhists 
interpret the 8-fold path as a list of virtues in conjunction with the doctrine of the middle way.4  
The aims of my essay are dual. The first is to articulate  a straightforward application of 
Buddhism on the contemporary ethical discussion of MW. The second is to discuss the similarities, 
clarify the  differences, and demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses relative to each other  of a 
Buddhist and  a WVT perspective on MW. While a virtue-ethics interpretation of Buddhism is 
now widely accepted and has been applied to several moral issues, not much has been written 
about MW using a Buddhist-Aristotelian comparative framework. As pointed out in one study, 
assessment of issues in business ethics is usually hampered by  exclusive reliance on Western 
models (Sanchez-Runde et al 2013). In my conclusion, I will argue that Buddhism is not an 
alternative to WVT, but it offers significant contributions to  WVT’s approach to MW and even 
corrective to some of its  shortcomings. 
This essay has limitations. Like most studies of MW from an ethical or managerial 
standpoint, it focuses on one specific way in which human work finds embodiment, i.e. as 
experienced in paid employment. There are different interpretations of Aristotelian and 
MacIntyrean  ethics and to take account of all of them and resolve their differences in one essay is 
not possible. A detailed application of specific virtues to the workplace is outside the scope of this 
study. I make no claim of presenting with finality or authoritativeness The Buddhist Philosophy of 
MW. “Since Buddhism is an amorphous movement with no clear hierarchy or locus of authority, 
it is difficult to make authoritative statements of the kind ‘The Buddhist view on issue x is…’ 
without qualification.” (Keown 2004, p. 174) Neither do I intend to represent any particular school  
of Buddhism. It is well known that the term Buddhism does not refer to  a single and systematic  
body of teaching, but is rather made up  of historically and culturally diverse beliefs and practices 
that evolved from the teachings of Siddhartha Gautama. Thus, there is no single ethical system 
followed by all Buddhists.5  
 
3 “There is, bhikkhus, that base where there is no earth, no water, no fire, no air; no base consisting of the 
infinity of space, no base consisting of the infinity of consciousness, no base consisting of nothingness, no 
base consisting of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; neither this world nor another world nor both; 
neither sun nor moon. Here, bhikkhus, I say there is no coming, no going, no staying, no deceasing, no 
uprising. Not fixed, not movable, it has no support. Just this is the end of suffering.” (Nibbana Sutta Ireland 
2012) 
4 “Both [the Buddha and Aristotle] understood the mean as something more complex and more intricate 
than an equal distance from opposite ends, an arithmetical mean, or mechanical equilibrium (equipoise).  
They presented the mean regarding human beings as a state (condition) which is never given a priori” 
(Lysenko 2007, p. 62). 
5 “This theory of more than one ethical system is more flexible and in accord with the actual moral practices 
of Buddhist communities, both those mentioned in the texts and these that inertly exist.” (Promta 2005, p. 





WVT AND MEANINGFUL WORK 
 Virtue (arête or excellence in Greek )  is a stable disposition to act, think, desire, and feel 
in a way that helps us achieve  our telos by enabling us to fulfill our distinctive human function.  
For Aristotle, our actions when habitually performed have a major influence in the kind of person 
we become  and in our overall well-being. They enable us to live a flourishing life  (eudaimonia). 
His thesis rests on the notion that human persons, like all other beings have a particular telos that 
is found in their proper function. Having a rational soul, the human function is to think and  act in 
accordance with right reason. Thus he distinguishes virtues as virtues of action (moral) and  of 
thinking (intellectual).  Nicomachean Ethics explains eudaimonia as the highest form of activity 
that satisfies all the conditions for human good. The ideal life is that which is devoted to intellectual 
contemplation (theória). Excellence in moral action lies in moderation. This refers to a choice 
lying in the mean relative to a situation as appropriately determined by practical wisdom 
(phronesis). Phronesis is one of the most important intellectual virtues, the latter includes  wisdom 
(sophia), scientific knowledge (episteme), intuition (nous) and  skill (techne). It is the complete 
virtue as it implies  understanding the relationship between the  universal good and particular 
circumstances and the capacity to figure out the appropriate response. “And it seems then to belong 
to someone with practical judgement to able to deliberate beautifully about things that are good 
and advantageous for himself.” (Aristotle 2002, p. 106) Phronesis unifies all virtues, and  is a 
necessary condition for all virtues because it involves our ability to perceive  morally relevant 
factors.   
 According to Beadle (1998),  MacIntyre’s notion of practice is of paramount importance if 
we are to understand employment  as the setting to exercise virtues and achieve the good life. 
Virtue ethicists regard professions as the context in which practices occur. Following Aristotle, 
MacIntyre develops the concept of practice that  provides  the framework in which virtues are 
acquired. Practice is 
 
   any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human  
  activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realized in  
  the  course of   trying to  achieve those standards of  excellence  which are  
  appropriate to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result  
  that human powers to  achieve excellence, and  human  conceptions of the   
  ends and goods involved, are systematically extended. (MacIntyre 2007, p.187) 
 
Practice refers to activities that have standards of excellence and specific goals. It entails 
competence that comes as a result of training, discipline and commitment. Practices are distinct 
from skills. Skills do not admit innovation, contrary to practice. Compared to skills, practices have 
dynamically complex aims rather than  fixed. Practices are human activities that served as medium 
for human excellences. Although MacIntyre does not speak of employment itself, he includes 
productive crafts (e.g. fishing) in his examples. Every practice contains specific internal goods, i.e. 
goods valued for their own sake.  They are “particular excellences or products realized through the 
activity of a particular practice, goods that cannot be gained without engaging in the activity of the 
practice itself.” (Vodehnal 2010, pp. 66-67) Internal goods are transformative. They are “goods of 
character that make a claim on our identity and give definition to life – they shape who we are and 
make us persons of a particular sort.” (Muirhead 2004, pp. 155-156)   An excellent portrait  is the 
result of the actualization by the painter of the standards of excellence required  in painting. The 
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former also actualizes something else, the good of a certain life, e.g. “the painter's living out of a 
greater or lesser part of his or her life as a painter”   (MacIntyre 2007, p. 190).  Virtues are acquired 
qualities that enable a person to achieve internal goods. “A virtue is an acquired human quality the 
possession and exercise of which tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to 
practices and the lack of which prevents us from achieving any such goods.” (MacIntyre 2007, p. 
191) They are excellences that produce internal goods that include excellence in the product and 
the flourishing of the individual.   The person who exercises virtue  pursues a practice for the sake 
of its internal  rather than external goods (e.g. fame, power, reputation, or money).  Since what is 
required to excel in one profession is not the same  in  another, there are virtues that are specific 
to a certain profession in contrast to everyday or ordinary virtues. There are virtues specific to a 
practice as well as general virtues that are needed for every practice such as courage, patience, 
fortitude. etc. The former are role-oriented,  they are specified  within a framework of a given 
profession (Annas 2015). 
 
 “In order to survive, however, practices need to be housed within institutions which are 
concerned with  external goods.” (Fernando and Moore 2015, p. 186) External goods are the ends 
of institutions.  They are goods in so far as they are instrumental in the actualization of internal 
goods. Unlike internal goods that are practice-specific, external goods are generic.  MacIntyre 
warns against the corrupting effects of institutions, including corporations, that make workers 
focus on external goods rather than acquisition of virtues. While he recognizes the interdependence 
between internal and external goods (MacIntyre 1989, p. 35) as institutions provide the material 
needs and structural support for practices,  he identifies an unavoidable tension  between the 
goal/success of institutions and the integrity of practice so that it is always necessary to protect 
practices from the corrupting power of institutions.  
 “It is a part of practicing a particular profession that you deal with a particular kind of 
situation… and so virtues you display have to be in some way tailored to these situations, not a 
matter of going from one situation to another.” (Annas 2015, p. 13) These role-oriented virtues are 
more specific than general virtues and are learned in a more specific way. They are found in a 
virtuous agent who performs certain actions required for the role or occupation that she has. Role 
virtues make ordinary virtues more precise, while ordinary virtues are prototype virtues that 
provide “anchors for moral thinking in role contexts, alerting us to possibilities of excess and other 
forms of wrongness.” (Swanton 2007, p. 217)  The distinction is between being  good in a role and 
being good qua human being. While the emphasis of Aristotle is the latter, his function (ergon) 
argument in Nicomachean Ethics begins by considering the different functions that humans are 
capable of such as flute playing or ship-building, and from this he inquires regarding our 
characteristic activity qua human beings. This shows that there is a connection between our proper 
or generic function as rational beings and our specific or role-related function, and this seems to 
be obvious for the very reason why we are capable of certain functions  that require the use of 
reason is because we have a rational nature. Virtues have different application from one function/ 
role to another,  and a truly virtuous person has the practical wisdom to know the difference.  
 MW enables us to develop our character and achieve our telos, which is not wealth, fame 
or power, but living  “fulfilled lives in which we make the most of our talent and abilities.” 
(Marchese et al. 2002, p. 149)  It allows workers to practice deliberative and self-developing skills,  
requires  application of intellectual virtues, and provides decision making opportunities where 
workers can exercise their ability to search for the mean as well as sound moral judgment. “From 
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an Aristotelian perspective, identifying and learning how to meet such challenges [in our 
employment] requires the exercise of the virtues”  (Beadle and Knight 2012, p. 435). We actualize 
ourselves through work  and at the same time our work is actualized because of  our virtues. 
Dehumanizing work  is definitely non-MW. But  “Other things equal, a complex, interesting job 
that demands the use of skilled, practical judgement enhances the capacities and satisfaction of the 
worker, whereas a boring, unskilled job dulls the mind. The former is also likely to bring more 
recognition than the latter, providing  the skilled worker with a source of self-esteem.” (Sayer 
2009, p. 2) MW contributes to the development of our potentialities. “We enjoy activities that are 
skilled, varied and complex more than simple, repetitive ones, and we may try to emulate others 
whose skills we admire.” (Sayer 2009, p. 5) Work that  does not provide opportunities for  
acquisition of virtues because either it is too tedious or it lacks room for the exercise of autonomy 
and judgment is non-eudaimonian and cannot be meaningful.  Because virtue is not taught but 
rather self-learned through practice, virtuous work requires high job engagement, autonomy, and 
exercise of practical wisdom. MW must entail activities that are open ended rather than mechanical 
or determined, i.e. activities that allow a continuous dialectical process between the subject’s intent 
and practice, and it is through this process that decision making, communication, imagination, and 
improvement of task take place (Walsh 1994). To be open ended requires  performing complex 
roles that give opportunities for self-expression, innovation, critical thinking, and creativity. 
One way to understand MW from the perspective of WVT is to see it as a kind of craft that 
necessitates perfection through discipline, and brings about personal satisfaction and  sense of 
pride and dignity. “Craft stands for the pleasure of work for its own sake. Craft is the worker’s 
desire to do a job as well as he or she can.” (Overell  2008, p. 42) According to Arneson (1987, p. 
522) the right to a MW implies a right to a work that “ involves some development or exercise of 
the individual’s intellectual or craft talents.”  It lies in a “midway on a continuum between boring 
and overwhelmingly difficult work. Work that is too far beyond my capacity ceases to be 
interesting  just as much as work that is too far below my capacity.”  Like the medieval guilds, 
craftspeople are skilled workers who are to an extent,  self-determining and self-managing (Moore 
2005, p. 248). Crafts  have determined standards of excellence that include learning, training, and 
apprenticeship. They do not only refer to mastery of skills, but the pursuit of excellence and this 
can only be done  by craftspeople working in a community (Moore 2005, pp. 250-251). Being a 
craft-practitioner  implies that one has specialized skills and has a sense of control over her work 
and “of creativity in adapting her general knowledge to the particular circumstances of the client.” 
(Simon 1997, p. 461) 
 
A BUDDHIST VIRTUE ETHICS   
The term virtue has no exact equivalence in Buddhism.  For Keown (1992, p. 191), the 
terms kusala (skillful or wholesome) and akusala (unskillful or unwholesome) are the Buddhist 
equivalent of good and bad respectively in virtue ethics.6 Whether an act is good or bad is 
 
6 See also Harvey (2000, p. 43). Ambalaṭṭhikārāhulovāda Sutta explains how to distinguish wholesome 
from unwholesome actions: “"Whenever you want to do a bodily action, you should reflect on it: 'This 
bodily action I want to do — would it lead to self-affliction, to the affliction of others, or to both? Would it 
be an unskillful bodily action, with painful consequences, painful results?' If, on reflection, you know that 
it would lead to self-affliction, to the affliction of others, or to both; it would be an unskillful bodily action 
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determined by motive or intention (cetana).7  The Buddha says “Bhikkhus, whatever qualities are 
wholesome, partake of the wholesome, and pertain to the wholesome, all have the mind as their 
forerunner. Mind arises first followed by the wholesome qualities.” (Anguttara Nikaya [AN] Bodhi 
2012, p. 98) Intention or cetana has both affective and cognitive aspect as it  refers to both motive 
and volition. Virtuous action involves motivation, intention,  and wisdom. For an act to be virtuous 
it must be well-motivated, well-intentioned, and wise (Fink 2013, p. 676).  The act must be done 
from selfless motivation with the intention of serving the good of the other and has good 
consequences (wisdom).8 Since mental intention plays a significant role in Buddhist ethics, 
meditation is essential for one to be ethical. It helps us explore deeply and clarify all our 
intentions.9 Thus, cultivation of virtuous character entails three paths of purification: purification 
of conduct (ethics),   view (wisdom), and  of mind (meditation).  
 The term  kusala also connotes the notion of skillfulness. A virtuous act must be  effective 
in bringing out the intended good results. Buddhism requires “the need for skillfulness, fittingness, 
and appropriateness in applying morality to the situation.” (Nelson 2009, p. 202) Good intention 
is  a  necessary but not a sufficient condition for a virtuous act, for the latter must ultimately lead 
to the realization of nibbana.  Like WVT, Buddhism emphasizes the importance of wisdom in 
enabling the agent to decide and choose which means is effective in attaining nibbana.10 But it is 
not enough to do good and avoid evil, because even good actions can lead to attachment. “When 
a bhikkhu is… Not attached, he does not tremble. Not trembling, he personally achieves nibbana.” 
(Mahanidana Sutta [MS]  Holder p. 38) One must eliminate attachment to all actions, whether 
good or bad. To realize nibbana, unwholesome thoughts like desire, hatred, fear and delusion that 
are the roots of evil actions must be purged (Sigalovada Sutta [SS] Holder 2006, p. 193). It is in 
this sense that Buddhism speaks of an arahant who is beyond karmic fruitfulness and has 
transcended all rebirths. Harvey (2000, p. 49) defines nibbana as the destruction of attachment. 
  
 As a  moral theory, Buddhism  “is not ultimately concerned with the development of 
individual virtues.” (Case and Brohm 2013, p. 63) Virtue is  the result of eliminating greed, hatred, 
and ignorance - the mental roots of unwholesome actions - by following the 8-fold path. Although 
one can find a   long list of virtues in Buddhist commentarial literature, some  are for laypersons, 
others for monks and nuns and some are for more advanced practitioners, these virtues are all 
 
with painful consequences, painful results, then any bodily action of that sort is absolutely unfit for you to 
do. But if on reflection you know that it would not cause affliction... it would be a skillful bodily action 
with pleasant consequences, pleasant results, then any bodily action of that sort is fit for you to do.” 
(Bhikkhu, 2006) 
7 Keown connects the Buddhist cetana with phronesis and phrohairesis of Aristotle, for cetana implies 
attention, reflection, and resolution. Ethical conduct  involves choice and deliberation among alternatives. 
8 An example given by Fink (2013, p. 677) of a non-virtuous action that is done with good intention but 
lacks wisdom  is giving alcohol to an alcoholic. The intention of the giver may be good (to alleviate 
suffering) but the act is actually foolish rather than wise. 
9 There are  empirical and conceptual studies on how mindfulness can shape “human experiences in a wide 
variety of functional domains, including thought, emotion and action.” (Good et al 2015, p. 22) 
10 As a soteriological goal, Buddhists distinguish nibbana into two kinds: nibanna with a substrate – one 
that can be attained in this life, e.g. the nibbana attained by Siddartha when he reached enlightenment, and 
nirvana without a substrate or post-death nibbana.  In the first  kind, nibbana is not beyond the 8-fold path, 




extrapolated from the 8-Fold path. The Buddhist approach to moral cultivation is holistic as it 
includes cognitive, ethical and meditative or affective aspects.  The cognitive domain includes  
right view and understanding,  ethics covers right speech, right action and right livelihood, and 
meditative pertains to right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration. Following tradition I 
will take these three domains as the principal classification of Buddhist virtues: cognitive pertains 
to virtues of understanding, ethics to virtues of conduct, and meditation is the integration of the 
two (virtues of the mind). 
 In terms of practice, these three virtuous domains  are inseparable and mutually reinforcing.  
Ethics is intertwined with wisdom and meditation. To achieve enlightenment,  the 8-fold path must 
be practiced simultaneously, rather than numerically or sequentially. Central in Buddhist ethics is 
the virtue of compassion (Rahula 1994) to all beings,11  which is usually formulated into five 
precepts or sila.12  Rather than a set of rules, these precepts are taken as training guidelines that 
shape one’s character. The idea is to develop them to the best of one’s ability according to one’s 
actual conditions. One must equally care for her own welfare and the welfare of others –  to 
alleviate suffering itself regardless of who is the subject who experiences it. Living an upright life 
is necessarily connected to wisdom – understanding reality as it is: that all things are unsatisfactory 
(dukkha), non-substantial (anatta),  and transitory (anicca). Christensen (2000, p. 601) defines 
Buddhist wisdom as “the ability to best use knowledge for establishing and achieving desired goals 
and the process of discerning judgments and action based on knowledge.” Because it is 
accompanied by ethical reflection and meditation, “it refers both to an ability to act wisely in the 
conventional everyday world and to supra-mundane access to non-conventional truths” (Case and 
Brohm 2013, p. 61). Wisdom includes knowledge of the 4 noble truths (AN Bodhi 2012, p. 555). 
It eliminates all distortions, including personal  prejudices and other defiling mental states. We see 
that the conflict between the self and the other is false or apparent because the truth is that there is 
no individual or non-relational self (anatta doctrine) (Potthapada Sutta [PS] Holder 2006, pp. 145-
146). What we designate as self is a contingent collection of conditioned processes that cannot 
exist independently (Samyutta Nikaya [SN] Holder 2006, pp. 83-86; MS Ibid., pp. 36-38). One can 
accept the doctrine of anatta in theory, but it takes intensive meditation on no-self to fully 
overcome ego-centeredness. With this view, cooperation and sharing, rather than competition and 
self-interest are the characteristic marks of rational action.  “[A] wise person of great wisdom does 
not intend for his own affliction, or for the affliction of others, or for the affliction of both. Rather, 
when he thinks, he thinks only of his own welfare, the welfare of others, the welfare of both, and 
the welfare of the whole world.” (AN Bodhi 2012, p. 555) Finally, virtues are also states of mind, 
cultivating them mentally through meditation predisposes one to act virtuously. Regulation of 
action, thought, and emotion depends more on meditation rather than habituation. Being truly 
virtuous requires constant mindfulness to the act being performed at present (PS Holder 2006, p. 
134).  
 
11 “Just as a mother would protect her only child with her own life, even so, let him cultivate boundless 
thoughts of loving kindness towards all beings. Let one not deceive nor despise another person, anywhere 
at all. In anger and ill-will, let him not wish any harm to another.” (Metta Sutta  7-8 Nalanda Institute) 
12 “Buddhist cultivates moral virtue by observing ethical precepts, the most common of which are the ‘five 
virtues’ (pañca-sīlāni; BW.172–4). The avowal of each of these begins ‘I undertake the rule of training to 
abstain from... ’. The five abstentions are from: (i) ‘onslaught on [i.e. killing] living beings’, (ii) ‘taking 
what is not given’, (iii) ‘misconduct concerning sense-pleasures’, (iv) ‘false speech’, and (v) ‘alcoholic 
drink or drugs that are an opportunity for heedlessness’.” (Harvey 2013, pp. 268-269) 
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MEANINGFUL WORK AS RIGHT LIVELIHOOD 
 
 It is clear that Buddhism acknowledges the importance of work since it includes right 
livelihood   in the 8-fold path. Because what is ethically right is also virtuous in virtue ethics, we 
can call right livelihood as virtuous livelihood,  which is the  Buddhist conception of MW 
(Whitmyer 1994).  Unfortunately, the Buddha has little to say about right livelihood.  Early 
Buddhism proscribes all kinds of economic activities for monks (Gowan 2003, p. 178). The lack 
of focus on right livelihood reflects the tendencies in Buddhist tradition, especially during its 
earlier stage to emphasize monastic  life as a means to attain nibanna, while life of a layperson is 
a means to attain better rebirth.  But “Still the Buddha did support and teach laypersons. No aspect 
of the Eightfold Path was barred to them” (Gowan 2003, p. 169).   In addition, Buddhism manifests 
positive attitude toward wealth acquired through hard work.  Buddhism does not condemn wealth, 
what it condemns is greed or craving that is the origin and condition of attachment.  “Therefore, 
Ananda, just this is the root, the cause, the origin, the condition for attachment, namely craving.” 
(MS Holder p. 30) Like Aristotle, the Buddha says that  wealth cannot be an end in itself. The 
Buddha acknowledges  possession of wealth, economic independence, and freedom from debt as 
legitimate forms of happiness for a householder. He also talks about the right uses of wealth (AN 
Bodhi 2012, pp. 665-666): to support family, foster happiness of friends and colleagues,  protect 
oneself, and to give offerings to the sangha.13 Anguttara Nikaya (Bodhi 2012, pp. 1166 ff) 
compares wealthy persons  to a fertile field where rice grows for the benefit of all. A person with 
a stable source of income is not a burden to other people, and those with greater income have more 
resources to help alleviate the suffering of others. Wealth should be used to produce happiness for 
oneself and others. The Buddha also condemns  idleness and considers habits that cause 
squandering of wealth such as gambling and addiction as vices that must be avoided and 
eliminated. 
 
  Buddhist scriptures traditionally define right livelihood by contrasting it with wrong 
livelihood,  common examples of the latter are working as  a butcher, armament maker, prostitute, 
manufacturer of poisons and intoxicants,  or  in occupations that involve stealing or lying. These 
trades lead to bad rebirths. They cultivate wrong habits that predispose one to break the precepts 
under the virtuous conduct in the 8-fold path. Wrong livelihood is an obstacle to enlightenment 
because it causes harm (AN Bodhi 2012 p. 1493) to people and to the environment, including the 
workers themselves through overwork or dehumanizing working conditions.  It includes all forms 
of exploitative labor such as slavery, indentured servitude, bonded labor and sweatshop 
production. Likewise, work that has to do with production and sale of superfluous luxury goods 
and inferior products that will need to be replaced in a short period of time belongs to the category 
of wrong livelihood as it makes us use natural resources for unnecessary purposes. Wrong 
livelihood is also defined as any economic activity that is based on trickery or greed. We can 
include here insurance and accounting fraud, false advertising,  doing unnecessary harmful 
experiments on animals, and work that depletes the environment.  “Buddhism gives freedom to 
 
13 Dana or generous giving is  one of the most important virtues in Buddhism, especially for laity because 
it is through the exercise of generosity that lay people support the Sangha for all its needs: food, clothing, 
accommodations, etc. “The Sangha  is not an unproductive drain on the economy, as some have suggested, 
but a focus of cultural continuity and stability, supporter of an ethically sound society.” (Harvey 2000, p. 




everyone in seeking wealth. All people have the right to choose an occupation according to their 
skills and ability, but that occupation should be within the frame of ethics.” (Numkanisorn 2012, 
p. 46) Distinguishing right from wrong livelihood  requires wisdom (discernment) and  meditation 
(heightened awareness)  on how we choose to earn a living. 
 
 Expressed positively, right livelihood is that which is free from the influxes of desire, 
anger, and delusion. As something inseparable from the other elements of the 8-fold path (AN 
Bodhi 2012 pp. 1503-1505), it must be wise, ethical, and mindful.   It includes meaningful 
occupations that are wholesome, beneficial, skillful, and effective (in terms of quality of goods 
and services) in producing  positive effects, i.e. liberation from suffering and spiritual growth  for 
the individual and the community. Right livelihood entails the wise (i.e. efficient and careful) use 
of natural goods in order to satisfy the authentic needs of our community now and in the future. 
Right livelihood must also be done with mindfulness. This means consciously choosing the work 
that we do, being committed to it and   doing it well, even if at times we do not   enjoy what we 
are doing. We must develop the skills and abilities needed to do our work competently. 
Mindfulness “is cultivated by purposefully paying attention to things we ordinarily never give a 
moment’s thought to. It is a systematic approach to developing new kinds of control and wisdom 
in our lives, based on our inner capacities for relaxation, attention, awareness, and insight.” 
(Whitmyer 1994, p. 252)  In our daily work, we can be fully present in the actual tasks we are 
doing, and in the process,  become more mindful of our own thoughts, emotions and things we 
ordinarily do not notice. Although it is difficult to maintain this level of awareness, we can find 
opportunities to cultivate this virtue while doing some of the repetitive aspects of our work. “A 
further criterion for a justly applied right livelihood”  according to Baumann (1998, p. 131),  is 
that it “should not be carried out alone, but jointly with others. This feature provides the possibility 
of working together in a group with people who share the same ideals and thus encourage and 
inspire each other.”  
 Right livelihood is a setting for the cultivation and practice of virtues. For instance with 
regard to right speech, the Buddha says that our speech must not only be truthful, it must also be 
beneficial. We must not exaggerate nor embellish our words. Our words are powerful,  they can 
hurt other people, sometimes even unintentionally. In our company parties and celebration, we can 
practice moderation. In dealing with our clients, we have the opportunity to serve  them honestly 
and lovingly.  The presence of adversity, conflict and failure in the workplace enables us to 
exercise  diligence and equanimity that make us resilient to such challenges. 
It is true that employment involves roles since we relate to each other in the workplace 
according to the rules of expectations that come from the roles that we perform. But from a 
Buddhist perspective, it is not so much because of our  function or role in business activity that 
enables us to develop our specific human capacities that make our livelihood virtuous or 
meaningful. Rather, it is because in business, we enter into a relationship with our fellow humans 
and with the natural world.  Every time we practice virtues such as compassion or sympathetic joy, 
we do something incremental to our character, regardless of the outcomes. We become the kind of 
person who has the wisdom to apply virtues in our day to day interaction.  In Buddhism, virtues 
are situation-specific but  not role-specific. The only time roles come into play  in Buddhism is 
when it distinguishes between monk/nun and lay-virtues. But even among monks and nuns, they 
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are supposed to live in a community marked by equality and democratic practice.14 What takes 
prominence is the relationship between the practitioner and other persons. It is impossible to 
practice the virtues of compassion, non-harming, or  loving kindness in a non-relational context. 
Even when one meditates on these virtues, she first meditates on how they are practiced to herself, 
then projected progressively to friends and family, to strangers, and finally to her enemies. 
Through  work, we also become  part of a business organization that makes use of natural goods, 
establishing a relationship between us and the natural world. Many companies engage in activities 
that directly or indirectly exploit the environment. 
 Without virtues, any type of livelihood will degenerate into wrong livelihood, causing us 
to be attached to our careers, achievements, and wealth. Any type of work can generate greed and 
attachment. In Buddhism, having  MW is not simply a matter of choosing the right kind of job.  
There are many factors in our working life that reinforce our sense of selfhood and alienation, not 
only form our fellow humans but from other sentient beings too.  We face challenges that may 
cause anger or frustration, these have to be tempered by equanimity.  The competitive nature of 
doing business in the free market can be destructive to ourselves, to our community, and to our 
environment unless we practice compassion and loving kindness. Failures can cause depression 
and success, over-confidence. A Buddhist should not be depressed or overly happy because she 
knows that all things are impermanent (Dham. 409-412 Wallis 2004, p. 83).  Even socializing and 
friendship in the workplace, which are focused on human relationship, are often “reduced to a kind 
of networking that facilitates getting ahead.” (Muirhead 2004, p. 99) With regard to the practice 
of virtue,  right livelihood has a dual role: it  gives us opportunities to practice virtues, but as it 
happens, virtues also enable us to cope with many challenges we encounter in the workplace. 
 
 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT 
  Both Buddhism and WVT  view work in a positive light. Despite the challenges we 
encounter in our workplace,  the latter could be a place where we can become fully developed 
human beings. Together with the 8-fold path, right livelihood leads to our moral, affective, and 
cognitive transformation. Like WVT, Buddhism gives emphasis  on intrinsic goods derived from 
work  as craving for external goods  can cause  suffering (Dham. 334-335 Wallis 2004, p. 70). 
While Buddhism recognizes the value of external goods,  what is more important is the acquisition 
of internal goods in terms of spiritual and moral values. The Buddha says that what is significant 
is not the increase/decrease of wealth or fame, but  cultivation of character (AN Bodhi 2012, p. 
102).  
  Although Buddhism contains some elements of  WVT,  there are substantive differences 
between the two. “For the Buddha, our unenlightened nature is deeply flawed, and only 
extraordinary measures can overcome this. Aristotle’s conception of human nature is quite 
different, the virtues develop our nature but they do not radically transform it.” (Gowan 2003, p. 
163) Buddhism is not only teleological but soteriological: the final end is liberation or nibbana. 
Contrary to eudaimonia of Aristotle, nibbana is not only the cessation of suffering or the extinction 
of samsara, it is the ultimate unconditioned reality. “Here bhikkus, I say there is no coming, no 
 





going, no deceasing, no uprising. Not fixed, not moving, it has no support. Just this is the end of 
suffering.” (Nibanna Sutta Ireland, 2012) Aristotle’s account of a good life is based on his 
anthropological view of a well-functioning rational individual that gives emphasis on reasoning as 
the prime human activity. “The good of human being then, will be exercising that capacity well.”  
(Pakaluk 2005, p. xii)  Intellectual virtues are considered the best and complete virtue. “Aristotle 
appears to claim  that happiness is to be identified with just one good, that of philosophical 
contemplation” (Pakaluk 2005, p. xii) or bios theoretikos, the mode of existence that distinguishes 
us from animals (Lysenko 2007, p. 65). 15  While there are those who interpret Nicomachean Ethics 
as expounding an inclusivist view that defines eudaimonia as comprising of different kinds of 
activity, the notion that speculative thought is the highest good remains central to WVT.  As 
MacIntyre (2007, p. 219)  points out, “the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good 
life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand 
what more and what else the good life for man is.”  Unlike the Buddha, Aristotle and MacIntyre 
were not concerned about right livelihood or MW. The practices of definitive work, as understood 
by MacIntyre are not reducible to work as experienced in employment relationship. Complexity is 
central to practice and many of MacIntyre’s  examples are drawn from fine arts, sciences, and  
games – they are not readily compatible with market or organizational bureaucratization. If one 
makes  a straightforward application of the notion of practice  to MW,  primary consideration 
would be given on the “standards of excellence and the systematic extension of human powers to 
achieve excellence” (Moore 2005, p. 250). While virtues  involve more than skills,  a number of  
WVT writers consider the complexity of  skills in determining what is  MW (Clark 2017; Yeoman, 
2014; Moore 2005; Simon 1997; Walsh 1994). 
If virtue is excellence in human function, MW must involve high degree of understanding 
and mastery to promote the flourishing of human powers, especially the intellectual ones. Many 
individuals however, either through lack of education, talent or both, are not fit to share in the 
internal goods that some  types of work offer.16  In addition, not every work is sufficiently complex 
to qualify as a practice. Blue collar and lower white-collar  jobs that are boring, too simple, 
mechanical, and do not involve much decision making or intellectual stimulation would fall short 
of these standards.  But to eliminate them will lead to massive unemployment  as they provide 
decent livelihood to many semi/unskilled workers.  Because of automation, even professionals 
engage in some form of routine activities. Most tasks can become repetitive when done frequently 
over a long period of time.  Distribution of less challenging work as proposed by Sayer (2009) 
does not really eliminate repetitive work, it only makes the latter available for more workers. While 
this may satisfy our demand for distributive justice as Sayer  (2009) argues, the issue of trying to 
cope with or make sense of these tasks is still a challenge.  
Contrary to WVT, Buddhism does not speak of the person’s proper function or purpose 
(ergon) in  theorizing  virtue. The foundation of  Buddhist ethics is the reality of suffering.  Rather 
than habituation, Buddhism emphasizes the importance of meditation or spiritual formation as a 
 
15 “Nevertheless, Keown’s argument for the parallel between Buddhist and Aristotelian ethics is problematic 
given that Aristotle’s phronesis (prudential judgment or sense of appropriateness) is primary an aristocratic 
mastery, an accomplishment for the practical householder and active citizen, whereas Buddhist moral 
skillfulness (Pali: kusala) transcends the ekos and polis to a kind of freedom in relation to people and 
things.”  (Nelson 2009, p. 203) 
16 I understand that this is also a social justice question. To articulate a Buddhist conception of social 
justice and apply it to the workplace is not possible given my limited space. 
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necessary condition for the acquisition of virtues.17 Because of the absence of the ergon argument,  
Buddhism avoids the areteic tendencies of WVT.18  As an integral part of 8-foldpath,  every 
productive manual or intellectual activity that qualifies as right livelihood has internal goods in the 
sense that it shapes our character and is an essential part of a life well lived, even if it is not complex 
enough to count as practice. The most important aspect of MW in Buddhism is that it alleviates 
suffering. It does not matter whether it involves higher skills or not. In Buddhism, right livelihood  
“is interesting, absorbing work. Not so much because it is exciting, glamorous work, but more 
because the mindfulness practice involved makes it possible to be fully present in the work, 
whatever its day-to-day reality might be.” (Whitmyer 1994, p. 255) Nonetheless, this does not 
mean that no measure should be done to change the conditions of employees on the production-
line  through improvement in work design, job rotation or reduced working hours, especially if 
their condition is deplorable. Nor does this imply that we should resign ourselves to jobs that are 
below our talents or abilities even if  more complex and challenging occupations are available. 
The Buddhist goal of alleviating suffering applies to all beings, including workers themselves.   
 A common criticism against WVT is that  “it emphasizes the goodness of the agent’s own 
life and character.” (Walker and Ivanhoe 2007, p. 7)  Aristotle of course thinks that a virtuous 
person is one who has considerable concern for the good of others.  While the goal in WVT is the 
development of one’s character, the  human being for Aristotle  is a political animal who has the 
ability to regard the good of the other as one’s own. Human beings have a natural friendship for 
each other (Aristotle 2002, p. 144).  Both MacIntyre and  Aristotle stress the importance of 
community  in character formation as virtues are practiced in a social context. Developing virtues 
needs community support. Individual flourishing can only take place in a peaceful  and orderly 
society so that there is an interdependence between the flourishing of the individual and of the 
society where she lives in. Eudaimonia is first achieved through the combination of internal goods 
we acquire in  practices we engage in,  but MacIntyre also adds the significance of the common 
good through which the individual good is achieved, since  practice is a cooperative human 
activity. “Every practice requires a certain kind of relationship between those who participate in 
it. Now the virtues are those goods by reference to which, whether we like it or not, we define our 
 
17 There are  philosophers today who are suspicious of Aristotle’s account of habituation (Annas 2015, p. 
3).  Aristotle seems to believe that through habituation of our intellectual and physical activities we will be 
able to think, feel, and act as a virtuous person. The notion that virtue is the result of mindless repetition is 
perhaps on account of Aristotle’s analogy between acquisition of virtue and learning a practical skill, like 
playing a lyre or shipbuilding. But for Aristotle, acquisition of habit is not merely a mindless repetition. 
Performance of virtue requires thoughtful analysis of every situation or context in which the virtue is to be 
exercised. His comparison with practical skill is meant to highlight the notion that in performing virtues, 
one acts in a way that is spontaneous and immediate, but not a matter of routine. Similarly in Buddhism, 
there is no struggle for an enlightened person in performing virtues. The latter seems a natural expression 
or a second nature that occurs without any doubt or hesitation. This is the reason why in Mahayana 
Buddhism, the boddhisattva is said to act without any goal in the sense that he does not have to consciously 
deliberate the goal of his action. He knows it intuitively.  
18 “[T]he Aristotelian word arête, [which] is translated both as virtue and excellence helps in the realisation 
that, in practical terms, this would mean endeavouring to produce the best of which the individual is capable. 
Thus the marketing manager would design and execute not just a marketing plan but the best marketing 
plan of which she was capable. And, bearing in mind the virtue of phronesis (practical wisdom), the concept 
of “best” would involve not just a plan that was conceptually and creatively excellent but one that would 
“deliver” as far as the organisation was concerned.” (Moore 2005, p. 249) 
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relationships to those other people with whom we share the kind of purposes and standards which 
inform practices.” (MacIntyre 2007, p. 191)  
However, the Buddha’s  call for the virtue of compassion for all sentient beings is more 
universal and inclusive than WVT’s regard for the common good. Aristotle does not speak of 
universal compassion in the way  Buddhism speaks of it. In fact, he does not include compassion  
in his list of virtues (although he considers friendship as a virtue).19  Generally, Buddhist virtues, 
not only in the moral domain of the 8-fold path but the derivative ones such as compassion, loving-
kindness, sympathetic joy, and equanimity (Kalama Sutta Holder 2006) are relationship-
oriented.20 What they promote is not necessarily professional excellence but better human 
relationship in and outside of the workplace. This does not mean that professional excellence is 
unimportant. An incompetent physician for example, can cause harm to her patients. A virtuous 
physician however, is not only competent, she is also compassionate. Further in considering what 
is MW from a Buddhist perspective, we have to look at the consequences of our actions, not just 
to the human community but to the environment as a whole. The external goods we create though 
work, if they are used to benefit others are essential part of MW, even if they are not  goods internal 
to our profession. 21  It is only when we pursue external goods for our selfish gratification that  they 
become obstacles to MW.22 Buddhism rules out certain types of work as non-meaningful because 
they are harmful regardless of the complexity of skills or high intellectual challenges that they 
provide (e.g. production of violent video games, forgery, manufacture of  nuclear weapons). On 
the other hand, work that includes menial tasks like cooking or sweeping floors is highly valued 
when performed with mindfulness and in the spirit of service.  
Buddhism and WVT agree on the instrumental value of external goods and their corrupting 
influences that we have to be wary about. But even internal goods for the Buddha can lead to 
suffering. Many professionals  are so attached to their work, causing them to neglect their own 
wellbeing and the welfare of their loved ones. The Buddha teaches: “Do not be attached to what 
is pleasing. Not seeing what is pleasing is painful as is seeing the unpleasing….There are  no 
bounds for those people for whom there is no notion of pleasing and unpleasing.” (Dham. 210-211 
Wallis 2004, p. 46) Buddhism does not pay much attention to the distinction between internal and 
external goods in relation to MW, unlike MacIntyre who views the two goods as almost 
diametrically opposed. “Only reluctantly does  MacIntyre concede that practices might have 
vicious effects on the larger society. Because he focuses  mainly on the way practices constitute 
the good life for those who participate in them, he tends to neglect the relation between internal 
goods and the common good.” (Muirhead 2004, p. 169) It is not that  there is an ‘inherent’ conflict 
between internal or external goods that is the issue, but the motivational hold of external goods on 
workers, oftentimes reinforced by management itself. The excessive valuation of external rewards 
 
19 See Aristotle 2002, pp. 143-145. 
20 Equanimity is “the ability to see everyone as equal, not discriminating between ourselves and others…We 
shed all discrimination and prejudice, and remove all boundaries between ourselves and others.” (Thich 
Nhat Hanh 1998,  p. 174) Compassion, loving-kindness, sympathetic joy, and equanimity are called the 
four illimitables in Buddhism. 
21 In WVT, external goods are genuine goods. But unlike internal goods that are goods of excellence, 
external goods are goods of effectiveness (Moore 2002, p. 28). 
22 “Neither for your own nor for another’s sake should you wish for a son, wealth or empire. You should 
not wish for your own success if acquired by improper means. You should be virtuous, wise, and 
honorable.” (Dham. 84 Wallis 2004, p. 19) 
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as motivators, the practice of linking this with the value/worth of work, and the  devaluing of  front-
line   jobs  make work all about earning a living rather than finding fulfillment. 
While  WVT considers the importance  of our social nature since flourishing cannot be a 
purely individual endeavor,  the central ethical goal is still one’s own virtue or flourishing, which 
may be interpreted to suggest  that a person who desires virtue is motivated by selfishness or 
egoism. WVT generates what Rosso et al (2010, p. 102) call a self-oriented perspective  that “does 
not do justice to the relational nature  of experience at work.” (Wrzesniewski  et al. 2003, p. 94) 
With the Buddhist anatta doctrine, such interpretation of virtue ethics, even if  misleading is not 
possible. Buddhism calls for a radical transformation by challenging our conventional notion of 
an isolated and independent self. But Buddhist altruism does not imply a complete denial of 
oneself. One must equally care for one’s welfare and the welfare of others. A statement attributed 
to the Buddha is “Whoever loves himself will never harm another.” In fact, Buddhist virtues are 
all about constructing and preserving “relationships and communities, as much as cultivating 
oneself.” (Whitehill 2000, p. 29) Good acts can have self and other-regarding motives as the two 
are not inherently opposed. Moreover,  Buddhism teaches that all beings are interconnected  in the 
natural processes of birth, suffering, old, age, and death. “Individual well-being cannot be 
separated from the well-being of all.” (Swearer 1998, p. 92) 23 The Buddha considers a person who 
practices virtues for her own welfare and for the welfare of others as more preeminent than a person 
who practices for the welfare of others but not for herself (AN Bodhi 2012, p. 477).   
Since motivation is important in WVT, it agrees with Buddhism in giving consideration to 
the relation between actions and  mental states. Although Aristotle does not speak of meditation, 
he emphasizes the importance of developing intellectual virtues. The practice of meditation can 
help cultivate these virtues. But WVT  tends to undermine  work that “is devoid of opportunities 
for the performance of eudaimonian activity.” (Walsh 1994, p. 243)  On the other hand, Buddhism 
locates the ethical good of MW both in  activities/skills  and in personal relations that take place 
in the workplace. Under the rubric of right livelihood, there is no need to distinguish different 
types of employment or job roles.  This makes employment itself as a kind of practice that requires 
virtues so that we can experience enlightenment or fulfillment in our working lives.   Any type of 
work entails being connected with someone, whether as a manager, customer, supplier, or co-
worker.  Every time we practice virtues such as compassion or generosity, we do something 
incremental to our character, regardless of the outcomes. Our compassion may not be appreciated 
by others, it  may be misinterpreted as insincere or simply  a kind of social investment. Our 
generosity may be abused. Our empathy may not make any difference in our workplaces, but 
regardless,  our virtuous actions shape our character – we become the kind of person who has the 
wisdom to apply virtues in our day to day interaction.   In Buddhism, we must not only be wary of 
the corrupting influences of external goods, even internal goods can lead to attachment. We cannot 
be considered virtuous in a Buddhist sense if we succeed in our professional life but not outside of 
 
23 This view,  called the doctrine of paticcasamuppada or dependent co-arising is usually expressed in 
twelve causal links.  “Dependent on ignorance, there are dispositions to action; there is consciousness; 
dependent on consciousness, there is psycho-physicality; dependent on psycho-physicality, there are the six 
bases of sense; dependent on the six bases of sense, there is contact; dependent on contact, there is feeling; 
dependent on feeling, there is craving; dependent on craving, there is attachment; dependent on attachment, 
there is becoming, dependent on becoming, there is birth, dependent on birth, there is aging-and-death, 
sorrow, lamentation, pain, despair and distress. Thus there is the arising of whole mass of suffering.” (SN 
Holder 2006, p. 83) 
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it.24 This does not mean that there cannot be any conflict between  our professional and personal 
lives or between role-virtues related to professional excellence and relationship-virtues, but I do 
not see any reason why such conflict should be inherent.  
 
TOWARD A CROSS-CULTURAL PARADIGM OF MW  
In developing a cross-cultural virtue-ethics model, I will answer three crucial questions 
that are asked regarding MW from the perspective of organizational studies research: What makes 
work meaningful? Why does meaningfulness matter? and How can meaningfulness be cultivated? 
(Michaelson  et al. 2014). 
 
What makes work meaningful and why does it matter?  
At the outset, right livelihood in Buddhism  is in harmony with the human fulfillment 
model  of MW that WVT advocates  where work is considered as a teleological activity having 
the actualization of human potential as its final end. Virtuous work leads to a fulfilled existence. 
Both descriptive and normative, Buddhism and WVT avoid subjectivity in understanding MW 
without imposing  a single normative definition by considering the worker’s actual conditions and 
purpose or ends. As Ciulla (2000, p. 225) convincingly argues, to define MW on the basis of one’s 
subjective preferences is morally dangerous. Rather than a subjective notion, meaning  is intrinsic 
to certain types of work because it relates to activities involved it their performance, either because 
these activities promote excellence or alleviate suffering. The two perspectives provide an 
adequate and relevant account  that distinguishes MW from a non-meaningful one, while avoiding 
the pitfall of a circular definition (MW is the kind of work that workers find meaningful) found at 
times in a purely empirical approach. Because virtues involve structured activities directed at 
specific aims, virtue ethics is amenable to empirical research in so far as those activities can be 
identified and measured, including comparative assessment of virtues developed by people who 
are engaged in the same practice but work in different companies. Both Buddhism and WVT 
articulate an evaluative judgment regarding noble/good or enlightened mode of life that rules out 
certain occupations as unworthy of human pursuit. 
 
 What takes  primacy  in Buddhism is not  how we cultivate and perfect the  skills related 
to our professional roles, but how we relate with each other. It is not that Buddhism is against the 
development of our talents and abilities, but this is not sufficient in determining MW.  We need 
certain skills to do our work effectively or create harmonious relationships.  However, what is 
essential in a Buddhist MW  is not only the role of virtues in facilitating excellence in profession, 
but how virtues establish good relationships at work and improve  other lives.  Because Buddhism 
resists compartmentalization of virtues, Buddhist virtues cannot be located in an inherent way to 
any specific practice or profession, it cannot be reduced to mere professional excellence. “It is not 
ultimately concerned with the development of individual virtues. It cannot be as, in ultimate and 
 
24 As one Buddhist lawyer said, “For a Buddhist, each activity in his daily life provides an opportunity for 
greater enlightenment. Therefore, I have not separated my legal affairs from my community 
responsibilities.” (Kanazawa 1998, p. 1175) 
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absolute terms, there is no essential self. What Buddhist ethics does encourage in every sense is 
an opening up to the other as well as a gentle acknowledgement of relative conditions in which we 
find ourselves.” (Case and  Brohm 2012, p. 63) Rather than  role-oriented virtues, what Buddhism 
offers are relationship-based virtues. Our job roles are only a superficial aspect of who we are and 
do not constitute our true identity.  They can hinder us from our ultimate end if we become too 
attached to them.25 This can also lead to overvaluing of work and eventually promote attachment 
to one’s occupational or professional role, especially if the latter is seen as the locus of flourishing 
and personal fulfillment. Work per se cannot be the ultimate end of human life. Lips-Weirsma and 
Morris (2009, p. 495) wrote that “to find meaning, the cause for which individuals work must be 
a transcendent cause, in other words, a cause that extends beyond the boundaries of self.”   
Many managers may not share  the metaphysical commitments of  Buddhism but it is a fact  
that in today’s global economy where most things are interconnected, no work is accomplished in 
complete isolation without connecting the worker with other persons and with the natural world. 
There are evidence-based studies that indicate how harmonious interpersonal relationship in the 
workplace, perceiving one’s job to benefit some greater good, and work-life balance  are positively 
connected with MW (Fouche 2017; Fourie 2015; Munn 2013; Steger, et al 2012; Duchon and 
Petchsawanga 2012;  Dane  2011; Marques 2010; Valentine et al 2010; Lips-Wiersma and Morris, 
2009; Ayers, et al 2008). Service to the community is identified as a source of meaning for what 
some degrade as  dirty work, e.g. grave digger or garbage collector  (Klerk 2005).   Michaelson et 
al. (2014) also identify  the firm’s prosocial impact as a source of MW.  Cartwright and Holmes 
(2006) observe that majority of employees consider  friendly and helpful colleagues and close 
working relationship as more important than money. On the other hand, rather than any specific 
job task, a common source of frustration among employees is  antagonistic relationships in the 
workplace.   Managers at times blame employees  for poor service or decrease in productivity.  
With regard to their co-workers, some employees leave because they could not take an 
environment of constant pressure and harassment. Based on their research findings, Wrzesniewski 
et al (2003, p. 129) conclude that “The interpersonal dynamics that unfold between people at work 
create powerful contexts in which work meanings are composed.” 
While Buddhism gives more emphasis on other-regarding virtues,  I do not see 
irreconcilable conflict between Buddhism and WVT as long as the  specific roles that we have in 
connection to our occupation and the virtues that we exercise on account of it  are  not separated 
from our goal to pursue the good life, not only for our  individual self but for our community and 
for all sentient beings. To further synthesize the two ethics, we also need to revise the notion of 
excellence in WVT to include not just mastery of skills or complexity of our work. Standards of 
excellence of MW should  incorporate the quality of our relationships in the workplace and how 
the goods and services we create satisfy human necessities  rather than desires.  They should take 
into account as well the overall effects of our productive activities to the environment. 
 A Buddhist-WVT model of MW offers motivation for hard work, as virtue ethics in general 
has a motivational force. Employee motivation is  vital to the success of  any organization. That 
virtues  of  excellence in function are in line with the business’ pursuit of productivity 
maximization does not need further explanation. Buddhist virtues on the other hand that promote  
 
25 The notion of impermanence that is cultivated under virtuous wisdom in Buddhism “ is highly useful in 
the workplace, because it can help people to realize that the positions, titles, and honors they chase may be 
admirable, but are not lasting, hence not worth back-biting for.” (Marques 2012, p. 13) 
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good interpersonal relationship can create better interaction in the company and minimize tensions 
and interpersonal conflicts that interfere with the operation of the company or its overall growth 
and productivity. They can also encourage employees to go above and beyond what is required of 
them by spending more time to assist customers and being more willing to support each other and 
share their  talents. Workers are regularly confronted with ethical dilemmas and environmental 
issues that require wisdom to solve. As mentioned, mindfulness –  integral in the Buddhist 
cultivation of interpersonal virtues –  can promote positive relationship in the workplace  as well 
as elimination of negative mental states that can  cause discord and enmity among employees. This 
practice can also reduce stress and anxiety. On a daily basis,  employees and managers face 
multiple challenges in the workplace such as demanding customers, difficult bosses, or 
uncooperative co-workers.  In his study, Richmond (1999) points out that one does not have to be 
a Buddhist in order to benefit from these practices. Right speech (which includes writing email 
and memos,  telephone conversation, and deep listening) can foster  harmony and smooth 
interaction in the firm and minimize inaccuracy in communication that can create disruption. 
Knowing what is right livelihood will help business leaders understand how their employees who 
adhere to Buddhism view their work and thereby manage them in a move effective way. All of 
these can help a company  achieve higher levels of output.   
 
How can management cultivate MW?  
Some employers think that  to provide every employee with MW is unrealizable. The 
concept of workers’ flourishing  is too broad or vague to be the basis of determining MW,  it might 
be best to limit the discussion on working conditions that can be specifically negotiated in the 
bargaining of  contracts.  It is generally admitted that management has the moral responsibility to 
maintain  minimum standards of working conditions,  to respect the dignity of  workers and prevent 
abuses and exploitation, but such minimum standards do not necessarily promote human 
flourishing or MW (Michaelson 2005).  Not all jobs can be enriched or  re-designed, and not every 
employee can advance in their career. In every business organization, most employees belong to 
the rank and file level, with very few of them being promoted to the mid-level or top managerial 
positions. The assumption that “what people are looking for is to move up through the levels of 
the career structure, is not always accurate.” (Parker and Bevan 2011, p. 16) Liberal theorists for 
their part think that any obligation of the  management to provide employees with  a normatively 
defined  MW is paternalistic. People should be given the freedom to do any kind of work for any 
reason.  As  Lips-Wiersma and Morris (2009) point out,  there is  prevailing tension in MW 
literature between meaning as a personal search process and management of meaning through 
leadership and organizational culture. 
Since virtues for both  WVT and  Buddhism  involve practice,  they can be developed and 
cultivated in the workplace. Rather than  assume that MW is an outcome of discovery process of 
an individual’s will to meaning,   management has a lot to do in terms of job design and promoting 
positive relationship in the workplace. But on the other hand, since MW is a relational process and 
a matter of self-cultivation, workers themselves must play an active role. According to the Buddha, 
we are all responsible for our own enlightenment. Because virtues are activities that involve  




From the perspective of WVT, management practices that can make MW possible include  
enhancement of workers’ autonomy through delegation, participative management, and job 
enrichment –  providing workers with jobs that require various skills, higher level of knowledge 
and responsibility, complexity and variety, and those that offer space for growth and learning. 
(Klerk 2005). Management can enhance the full development of their employee’s potentials by 
motivating them to excel in their respective roles and giving them opportunities  to make use of 
their skills and judgments as well as access to necessary information and tools so that they can 
make responsible decisions. Currently, managerial focus is task or skill oriented i.e.  creating tasks 
related to roles and functions that will make work more meaningful or by promoting job-fit 
(Scroggins 2008). A job fits because it enables the worker to use her individual talents and abilities, 
or there is a harmonious alignment between work and the individual’s goals, values, temperament, 
and lifestyle (Muirhead 2004). The overall outcome is the achievement of a sense of control 
through  mastery of one’s performance, development of self-esteem, competency, and self-
efficacy. 
Consideration of  Buddhist perspective by managers on the other hand will provide them 
with more ways to promote MW. The emphasis on an independent and autonomous self with only 
an external and instrumental relationship to others runs counter to most of our experience in the 
workplace where deep personal interactions are made and most tasks cannot be performed in 
isolation, and to the view held by Buddhism that persons are historically situated beings embedded 
in mutually dependent relationships. According to Ho (1995, p. 128) the view of  “self-contained 
individualism, characterized by firm self-nonself boundaries, personal control, and an 
exclusionary conception of the person or self; this psychology is dominant in U.S. society today.” 
Each person is an individuated self with rights and privileges that need to be protected. One 
problem with this is that it may lead to the view that the management-employee relationship is 
adversarial  “because individuals within the organization are viewed as separate, autonomous and 
independent of one another, playing the win-lose or zero sum game of controlling available 
resources.” (Kanungo 1992,  p. 421) But the Buddhist framework goes beyond respecting the rights 
of the workers and participative management,  it aims to transform the organization into a 
community of persons whose lives are interconnected and interdependent.  All participants in a 
business enterprise –  shareholders, managers, associates, suppliers, and customers are social 
beings who are united by  a shared sense of purpose. This implies  a revision of worker-
management relation.  “When managers experience their “self” as a part of an enduring 
relationship with a sense of community, their behaviors tend to be guided by an interest to 
minimize the sense of powerlessness or alienation among workers and a responsibility for 
enhancing their self-worth.” (Kanungo  1992, p. 421) Respecting  the workers’ dignity and 
autonomy does not only involve protecting their rights, but also includes positive support for their 
wellbeing, in consideration of their present situations and actual options. This involves positive 
obligation of love and care. Management may not be able to eliminate all forms of tedious  work, 
but it can  do its best to reduce their incidence or minimize their negative physical and 
psychological effects.  Perhaps through full  automation, repetitive and dead-end jobs will be a 
thing of the past and Buddhism has no objection to this, as long as it would not cause suffering  
through massive unemployment and poverty.  
Each person has a potential Buddha nature, which means that every person has the capacity 
to be compassionate and to overcome her self-interest in order to promote the wellbeing of others. 
Since we are relational beings,  by being virtuous, one can influence others. The best way that a 
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manager can promote good interpersonal relationship in the workplace is by acting as a role-model. 
Management is in itself a kind of practice that  provides the setting for the exercise of Buddhist 
interpersonal virtues. Management can help solve not just professional but personal problems of 
their employees that may affect their productivity. It can  provide a supportive environment where 
all workers are respected  regardless of their positions, skills, educational attainment, and abilities. 
Organizing workers into smaller units would foster better interaction and cooperation that would 
minimize the anonymity of the work process. Respect of worker’s autonomy should be 
counterbalanced with efforts to foster teambuilding and solidarity. Working as a team encourages 
constant communication, collaboration, interdependence, and mutual respect and understanding. 
Perhaps, some business leaders can look at the Buddhist community (sangha) as a model for 
management  where  decisions are made through regular meetings, dialogue, and consensus 
building. Finally, since workers find their jobs more meaningful when they take part in something 
that is socially useful, business leaders are called upon to produce goods and services that truly 
meet the needs of society as well as to promote  corporate engagement in community through 
employee volunteer programs and charitable or outreach projects. 
Buddhism also recognizes that MW has a subjective dimension since it requires 
mindfulness. There are studies that indicate that employees do not simply derive meaning from 
their job tasks in a passive way, but actively search for it  (Rosso et al. 2010). Mindfulness is a 
mental skill that sustains attention when excitement and energy wane as a result of job burnout or 
boredom. There are various techniques involved in the practice of Buddhist meditation that can 
promote consciousness at work and make work experience a gratifying one (Thich Nhat Hanh 
2008).  Today there is a growing interest among business leaders of some of the largest companies 
in the United States to  promote meditation and  mindfulness at the office by investing in 
mindfulness training, meditation seminars, access to mindfulness literature, spiritual retreats and 
meditation or distraction free rooms. 
Mindfulness however, cannot wipe away all the negative effects of work, especially the 
physical and psychological exhaustion that comes with many types of work, including knowledge 
or intellectual work. One misunderstanding regarding Buddhism is that it encourages resignation 
by advocating a purely psychological or therapeutic approach to our  problems in the workplace. 
Indeed, several texts have been written  on how  Buddhist meditative practices   can enhance the 
quality of our oftentimes stressful and anxiety-filled working lives (Dhiman 2009; Thich Nhat 
Hanh 2008; Richmond 1999; Gould 1998; Whitmyer 1994). But Buddhists never consider 
mindfulness as a panacea. As mentioned,  meditation in the 8-fold path is inseparable from  wisdom 
and ethical action. Buddhist meditative practice is not simply a form of relaxation, but also an 
opportunity to pause and reflect on broader socio-political issues responsible for our afflictive 
condition in and outside of the workplace. Like other religio-ethical frameworks, Buddhism can 
be misappropriated by management as a tool of oppression and exploitation of workers, but this is 
obviously contrary to what Buddhism teaches.  
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
Consideration of Buddhism in our theorizing of MW leads to a broader, inclusive, cross-
cultural and holistic paradigm, especially from the perspective of virtue ethics because it calls for 
integration of our professional, interpersonal, and spiritual life. It offers the possibility of changing 
21 
 
our attitude toward our work as well as  cultivating the wisdom to discern ways to improve our 
working conditions and create a more compassionate economic system for all beings. Buddhist 
ethics is not an alternative, but a powerful and enriching complement to WVT that   has tendencies 
to be too elitist, rationalist, and anthropocentric (Whitehill 2000, p. 1).  It has much to teach to 
modern society that has become fragmented on account of commercialism, breakdown of 
communities, political polarization, and violence. The dominance of relationship virtues such as 
loyalty, cooperation, compassion, tolerance, patience, and empathy has been empirically verified 
in companies that operate in regions that are heavily influenced by Buddhism (Fernando and 
Moore 2015). Further empirical research is needed on the significance of these virtues in the 
workplace in Western societies and how can management effectively develop them. At present, 
much emphasis is given on the so-called hard skills such as cognitive and technical competencies 
in job hiring and career development/training. Few studies have specifically examined  
interpersonal  and relationship virtues, which are called soft skills, as sources of MW, especially 
in non-Western societies. A more holistic approach to MW should consider how “others inside 
and outside of the workplace influence the meaning of work.” (Rosso et al. 2010, p. 102)  Future 
agenda in MW research should also focus on the social dimension of work by considering the 
connection between MW and corporate social responsibility, corporate environmental impact, and 
employee volunteer programs.  
Rosso et al (2010) criticize the overreliance on an independent conceptualization of the self 
of Western orientation in management research. How we manage employees depends on how we 
view human beings. For example, a basic assumption in work motivation is that employees are 
self-interested (Michaelson 2005). “In contrast an interdependent  conception of the self (typical 
of Eastern cultural orientation) which conceives of the self as fundamentally interconnected with 
others might suggest  that greater interdependence is more meaningful for people than the pursuit 
of individual goals.” (Rosso et al. 2010, p. 99) A relational view of the self found in Buddhism 
implies greater emphasis on solidarity and cooperation rather than independence and autonomy. 
Empirical evidence is needed in order to find out whether autonomy and independence in the 
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